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INTRODUCTION
What drives bar exam success? For law schools, most empirical research has focused on
admission factors (Georgakopoulos, 2013), law school academic performance (Thomas, 2003),
bar preparation (Klein, 1991), and environmental factors (Taylor et al., 2021). Essentially, the
extant research has focused on who enters law school and what they do while they are there (and
during that brief period between graduation and sitting for the bar exam). However, little
research examines the institutional admission and retention policies that ultimately determine
who graduates and therefore sits for the bar exam at a given school.
Using multilevel regression methods, we rigorously test the novel supposition described in a
recent paper by Bahadur et al. (2021), which posits that a school’s bar passage rates are affected
by the rate at which schools both lose students to academic attrition (presumably those students
with the lowest grades and lower likelihoods of passing the bar exam) and gain students as a
result of transfer (those students with higher grades and greater likelihoods of passing the bar
exam)—a process which therefore inexorably alters the composition of law school cohorts. As a
result, a school’s low or high pass rate—according to Bahadur et al.—is not driven by “pedagogy
but rather prestidigitation. When law schools manipulate their matriculant pools via academic
attrition and transfer, that sleight of hand improves their bar performance rates” (Bahadur et al.,
2021, p. 2).
As a working paper, feedback is welcomed and encouraged; please email comments and questions to
jscott@accesslex.org.
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This open question is an important one—do law school attrition and transfer processes perhaps
explain improved bar passage rates when other factors or programmatic interventions are
credited with that success? Some interventions are heralded as the “silver bullet” for improving
bar passage, and since schools expend considerable finite resources to help improve their
students’ chances of passing the bar exam, it is important to identify whether the claims of a
panacea might have more to do with attrition and transfer rates than with the program itself.
Moreover, transfers have two effects: one school typically benefits from the addition of a
generally higher performing student, while the other loses said student in whom it had invested
substantial resources. Recognizing that first-year (1L) performance is a strong predictor of bar
success (Taylor et al., 2021), transfer removes from the originating school a student who is likely
to pass the bar exam and could therefore decrease that institution’s bar exam performance.
Further, when bar passage rates are tallied, the originating school receives no credit or
recognition for its investment; on the other hand, the receiving school receives full credit without
the expenditure of resources on that student’s formative 1L year. Indeed, many of the doctrinal
topics taught in the 1L year are tested on the bar exam.
Looking at transfers nationally, schools with lower median LSAT scores and lower U.S. News &
World Report rankings tend to lose more students to transfer, with those students typically
enrolling at institutions with higher median LSAT scores and rankings. In light of this trend, we
posit whether or not these transfer rates explain differences in school bar success.
To examine how attrition and transfer rates relate to bar passage, we seek to answer the
following questions:
1. On average, to what extent do attrition, transfer-in, and transfer-out rates affect
institutional first-time bar passage performance? (RQ1)
2. Does transfer activity vary by institutions’ geographic proximity to other law schools
with higher or lower rankings? And, if so, how? (RQ2)
3. Are the effects of attrition and transfer rates on institutional first-time bar passage rates
moderated by whether a law school is in close proximity to others with higher or lower
rankings? (RQ3)
BACKGROUND
Predicting first-time bar passage rates, whether for students or for schools, is tricky business—
the elements involved are not simple and straightforward. Instead, bar passage is driven by a
complex network of factors and their interplay, including those at administrative level, within the
classroom, at home, and intrinsic to test takers themselves (for example, their level of comfort
with taking standardized tests, particularly those with professional and financial ramifications).
Given that bar passage is the result of a complex interweaving of factors, it is critical to
recognize that any single factor undoubtedly moves in tandem with others. This makes it difficult
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to isolate and disentangle what is responsible for a school’s changing bar passage rate; hence the
need for careful consideration of control variables. 2
Adding a layer of complexity are the high stakes associated with the bar exam, not only for
students but for law schools themselves. According to the American Bar Association (ABA), bar
exam performance “is likely the single best outcome measure to consider in assessing whether a
law school is maintaining a ‘rigorous program of legal education’” and “is one of the critical
pieces of consumer information that prospective law students should consider in deciding where
to study law” (American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
2019, p. 1). Hence, there are strong regulatory and financial incentives tied to bar passage.
In 2019, ABA Standard 316, which sets a minimum threshold for bar passage, became more
stringent. It now mandates that:
At least 75 percent of a law school’s graduates in a calendar year who sat for a bar
examination must have passed a bar examination administered within two years of their
date of graduation. (American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, 2021, p. 25).
Noncompliance results in public notice and can, ultimately, lead to loss of accreditation.
Historically, the loss of ABA accreditation leads to school closure. Thus, these revisions to ABA
Standard 316 increased the threat of punitive action.
Taken together—the financial incentives, accreditation standards, and the limited locus of
control law schools have on standardized test performance—schools face tremendous pressure to
improve their bar passage rates.
Research predicting school first-time bar passage rates is nascent. Early research on the topic
tended to rely solely on school-level LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA (UGPA) to explain
and predict variation in bar passage. (See for example, Ryan, 2019; Kinsler & Hudson, 2017;
Kinsler & Usman, 2018; and Kinsler, 2021.) Although research has consistently demonstrated a
link between student-level LSAT scores and UGPA and future bar success, Taylor et al. (2021),
Georgakopoulos (2013), and Farley et al. (2018) find that the effect is modest, particularly
relative to the predictive ability of law school GPA. Moreover, relying only on LSAT scores and
UGPA ignores the inherent complexity of the factors driving school pass rates (Ryan et al., 2021;
Ryan & Muller, 2022). Nonetheless, these early attempts lay an important foundation for
research such as ours.
A 2021 paper by Professor Rory Bahadur and his colleagues presented a novel explanation for
what might be driving institutional first-time bar exam performance: high attrition and transfer-in
rates at some schools might explain their high bar passage rates, and concomitantly low attrition

Control variables are those items added to a model which are related to the outcome of interest (e.g., bar passage
rate) as well as the variable(s) of interest, i.e., “explanatory variables.” Failing to include these confounding factors
can yield unreliable results, which may over- or understate the effect of a program, policy change, or other variable
of interest.
2
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and high transfer-out rates at others might explain their lower bar passage rates. As a result, the
composition of a school’s given cohort changes, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1

As a Result of Attrition (red bars) and Transfer (green bars), the Median LSAT and UGPA of a
Cohort Can Change Substantially
Hypothetical Class Composition Over Three Years
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According to Bahadur et al. (2021), students with the lowest grades are dismissed from the law
school via academic attrition. These students happen to be those who have the lowest probability
of passing the bar exam (Taylor et al., 2021); thus, these schools presumably increase their bar
passage rate by dismissing their lowest performing students. While every school has a formal
attrition process that involves dismissing particularly poor performers after the first year, the
authors contend that rather than use attrition as a last resort, some schools are using it as a
regular tool to improve their overall rate, unnecessarily dismissing large numbers of poor 1Lperformers.
This is a novel explanation of attrition in both legal and higher education scholarship.
Traditionally, research on attrition has focused on examining its causes, including academic
performance (e.g., Spady, 1970), intellectual development (Tinto, 1975), integration with peers
and the institution (Spady, 1970; Tinto, 1975), and external finances and support systems (Bean
& Metzner, 1985). Far from considering attrition as the culmination of forces driving poor
academic performance, Bahadur et al. (2021) posit that it is partly driven by (at least some)
schools’ calculation that their ranking or accreditation will be improved by increasing the
number of students they dismiss for academic performance. But this fails to account for the fact
that some institutions take chances on students that might not have stellar resumes. As such,
these institutions might be expected to attrit more students as ABA Standard 501 requires that
schools admit only students that “appear capable of satisfactorily completing its program of legal
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education and being admitted to the bar.” It is reasonable to assume that schools, particularly
mission-driven institutions, admit some students with lower LSAT scores or UGPAs, giving
them a chance to succeed in law school rather than denying them the possibility outright.
The second arm of Bahadur et al.’s supposition it that many schools with higher rankings on the
U.S. News & World Report’s Best Law Schools list replace those attrited students with transfer
students who exceled in their first year at institutions with lower rankings. These transfers, given
their high level of academic performance in their first year, are more likely to pass the bar exam
(Taylor et al., 2021).
But student transfers have two effects: on one hand, they benefit the school to which the higherperforming student transfers; on the other, they diminish the pool of high performing students at
the originating institution that invested substantial resources in the transfer student’s first year.
And in the end, when bar passage rates are tallied, the original school, which invested those
resources early on, is not credited with the student’s (likely) bar passage. In theory then, it seems
that higher-ranked schools might be advantaged at the expense of lower-ranked schools that have
fewer endowments and resources.
It is important to consider, however, that students have agency in the decision to transfer, and
ultimately make their determinations for myriad reasons, some unrelated to academics. Most
germane of these is that students seek transfer to higher-ranked schools to bolster their prospects
of obtaining competitive clerkship, internship, and employment opportunities, as well as other
postgraduate outcomes. Postgraduate employment opportunities are often tied to the national or
local prestige of the law school, which is generally greater for higher-ranked institutions, and
have substantial earnings implications for students.
Hence, just as schools act in their best interest, so too do students. Therefore, although transfer-in
rates at higher-ranked schools may appear greater than other schools, this is likely due to student
and market preferences rather than strategic or underhanded transfer admission practices at these
institutions.
These two factors—dismissing many poor performers and transferring in the best students from
lower-ranked schools—may, according to Bahadur et al., mean that some schools are receiving
or taking credit for outstanding bar passage outcomes that exceed jurisdictional averages, and
erroneously attributing this to exceptional academic and bar success programming (e.g., they
figured out the “secret sauce”). (For example, see Kinsler & Hudson, 2017; Ruiz, 2020; and
Ryan & Muller, 2022.)
To support their theory, Bahadur et al. (2021) provide several graphs that compare the attrition
and transfer rates (combined as the sum of a school’s attrition and transfer-in rates) at each of the
top-15 schools (as rated by Kinsler & Usman, 2018) to an average of similar 3 schools. The
figures presented indicate disparities between these top-15 schools and their peer institutions, but
they do not indicate whether these differences are related to bar passage. In fact, in examining
The comparison group of schools comprised schools with “either median LSAT scores within… two, or 75thpercentile UGPAs within… 0.1 of the entering credentials” (Bahadur et al., 2021, p. 36).
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the information reported by Bahadur et al., we find that, in more cases than not, when a school’s
combined attrition and transfer-in rates increase, its first-time bar passage rate decreases or
remains unchanged, which is contrary to the theory.
METHODS
Data
We use data disclosed and publicly available in accordance with ABA Standard 509. These data
are self-reported annually to the ABA by accredited institutions, with publicly available data
going back to 2011. They capture myriad student and institutional characteristics. Our sample
includes all ABA-accredited law schools (as of February 2021), except for those schools located
in Puerto Rico, as its bar exam contains an English proficiency component, which renders it
sufficiently dissimilar to the remaining jurisdictions.
In addition, we dropped Marquette University School of Law and the University of Wisconsin
Law School because their graduates are granted diploma privilege in Wisconsin; that is, their
graduates are admitted to the Wisconsin bar without taking the bar exam. These schools,
therefore, have bar passage rates of 100 percent and are not of interest when investigating
outcomes related to bar passage.
We use data for student cohorts entering law school between 2013 through 2016 and assume the
typical three years to graduation. Thus, in our sample, students would have graduated and taken
the bar exam between 2016 and 2019. 4
Our primary outcome variable 5 is the first-time bar exam passage differential of each law school
(hereafter “pass differential”), which is calculated by differencing:
• a school’s average first-time pass rate across all jurisdictions in which its students took
the bar exam for the first time, weighted according to the proportion of its students who
sat for the exam in each jurisdiction; and
• an average of the jurisdictional first-time pass rates of these jurisdictions, applying the
same weights as above. (See Figure A.1 for an illustration.)
This preference to use pass differential over pass rate is due in large part to the fact that each
jurisdiction sets its own cut score, the minimum exam score needed to pass the bar, which has
led to variation in what score constitutes minimum competence throughout the country. For
example, California’s high cut score makes it one of the most difficult jurisdictions in the
country, which has produced some controversy (Hunter, 2020). To account for this, rather than
use first-time bar passage rate, we use pass differential, as described above.

We elected to not include the 2017 entering cohort because of the COVID-19-related postponements and other
changes those graduates would have encountered when taking the bar exam in 2020. Our earlier research suggests
that as a result of these changes, the group of graduates taking the bar exam in 2020 was systematically different
than those in previous administrations.
5
Bar pass differential is our main outcome variable of interest, but RQ2 uses the counts of transfers in and transfers
out (separately) as outcome variables.
4
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Our primary variables of interest are law schools’ attrition, transfer-out, and transfer-in rates. If
Bahadur et al.’s theory is correct, we would expect to see pass differentials increase with higher
attrition and transfer-in rates.
When calculating transfer rates, we remove from each school those students that entered as a
result of a school closing (for example, Indiana Tech Law School and Arizona Summit Law
School, which closed in 2017 and 2018, respectively). Thus, the transfer figures we use should
reflect typical annual transfers between schools.
To address RQ2, we use the counts of transfers in and transfers out as the outcome variables in
two separate models. We then examine whether transfer markets—geographic areas of high
transfer activity between law schools—predict higher transfer activity, even when including
controls which account for other factors associated with attrition and transfers. This research
question allows us to determine if simply being near several high-ranked schools has an effect on
transfer activity, independent of other factors associated with transfers in and out.
For RQ3, we explore whether proximity to other law schools moderates the effects of attrition
and transfer rates on pass differential. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which schools
might be clustered regionally in such a way that they gain or lose students to nearby schools. For
example, a middle-ranked law school in a sparsely populated area like North Dakota will have
few law schools nearby, so high performers looking to transfer to a higher-ranked school after
their first year may be less likely to transfer simply because of the geographic distance. On the
other hand, a school in the Northeast region is more likely to be within close proximity to
another law school, particularly one with a higher ranking, and therefore appeal to highperforming students. Hence, this would make transferring more practical in terms of logistics and
geographic preference.
For RQ1 and RQ3, accounting for schools’ median LSAT scores and UGPAs is important given
those variables’ relationships with bar passage. Failing to account for these variables would
produce results that are unreliable and biased if they also happen to be correlated with the
explanatory variables (e.g., transfer or attrition rates). Moreover, to capture a wider range of
these variables, we create an index that combines a school’s 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile LSAT
scores and UGPAs. This is constructed by converting the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile LSAT
scores and UGPA into a proportion (total points out of a possible 180 for LSAT score and 4.0 for
UGPA). We then regressed our outcome by these combined variables. We compared the relative
size of the coefficients, using the relative size to weight the variables before adding them and
scaling the weighted sum to range between 0 and 1. The result is a more comprehensive measure
of a school’s entering students (our approach is an adapted version of that developed by Ryan
and Muller [2022]). We also consider a wide range of additional control variables, as described
in Table A.3.
Models
We employ two similar approaches in order to investigate RQ1 and RQ3, both of which use pass
differential as the outcome of interest. (See Table A.2.) RQ2, on the other hand, uses transfer-in
and transfer-out rates as the outcomes.
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RQ1
To explore the extent to which attrition and transfer rates affect pass differential, we employ a
fixed effects approach, such that generally:
where:

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 � + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + �𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝜀𝜀̅𝑗𝑗 �

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑗𝑗 is the difference between a given school’s weighted average first-time pass
differential (across all years of the analysis) and its first-time pass differential in year i;
β is a series of coefficients for each explanatory variable (𝑥𝑥), which are attrition,
transfer-in, and transfer-out rates;
�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 � is the difference between a given school’s average value for a particular
explanatory variable across all years of the analysis and its value in year i;
α is a cohort fixed effect; and
εij is the difference between the error terms.

Through this approach, we compare how changes in each school’s attrition, transfer-in, and
transfer-out rates relate to its respective changes in pass differential over the period 2013 to
2016. In essence, holding all else constant, we are testing whether a particular law school’s bar
pass rate increases concomitantly with years in which it attrited more students than average. We
then do this for each school individually.
These individual results are averaged across the 189 schools to arrive at the estimated average
effect attrition and transfer rates each have on pass differential. This approach allows us to
control for those factors that do not change (or change very little) over time at law schools. For
example, the school’s geographic location, the size of its student body, and the cost of
attendance. It cannot, however, given the data we use, account for programmatic changes that
occur at these schools. For example, if a school implements a new academic support program
during the study period. If this were to happen and the school were to also significantly increase
or decrease its attrition or transfer rates, then size of the effect might be either exaggerated or
diminished. However, because the estimates are the result of averaging across 189 schools, the
likelihood is low that the bias would be sizable and practically important.
For RQ1, our preferred model is a panel linear model which examines how attrition and transfers
affect first-time pass differential, holding constant several additional time-varying control
variables. This method allows us to compare each school to itself and account for changes in the
school’s enrollment, section size, and other factors. Since we are comparing schools to
themselves, we are therefore able to account for peculiarities that exist across the various
jurisdictions. We also interact attrition rate and transfer rate, a decision predicated on Bahadur et
al.’s supposition that these variables will co-vary. Indeed, we do find that the model better fits
the data when this interaction is included. 6
The models we present were chosen according to model fit using Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Akaike
information criterion (AIC) values, as well as theoretical considerations by the researchers. The preferred model is
the one which 1) aligns most with the predictors that are theoretically justified, and 2) produces the smallest errors
with the fewest variables such that the model is not overfitted.

6
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RQ2
Our second set of models examines whether geographic proximity to law schools with a higher
(or lower) rank influences transfer activity. It is plausible that, aside from all other factors that
may impact transfer activity, simply being located near a higher-ranking law school makes a
given school more likely to lose students to that higher-ranked school, since the transfer would
presumably involve less of a logistical challenge for the student. Put simply: if a student attends
law school in Chicago, it is easier for that student to move to another location in Chicago than it
would be to move to California—especially if transferring to another Chicago law school does
not necessitate the student change their living location at all.
The models for RQ2 use the counts of transfers in and transfers out, separately, as dependent
variables. For models of both transfers in and transfers out, we determine the effect that our set
of independent and control variables have on each, where our primary independent variables of
interest are proximity to law schools of different ranks.
RQ3
Our third set of models are an adaptation of fixed effects, which separate the effect of a particular
variable into two components (a within-school estimate and a between-school estimate), as such:

where:

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑗𝑗 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 � + 𝛾𝛾j + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑗𝑗 is the difference between a given school’s average first-time pass differential
and its first-time pass differential in year i;
β is a series of coefficients for each explanatory variable (𝑥𝑥), which are attrition, transferin, and transfer-out rates;
�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 � is the difference between a given school’s average value across the years of
analysis for a particular explanatory variable and its value in year i;
αi is a cohort fixed effect;
γ denotes a random effect parameter—a random intercept assigned to each school j; and
εij is the error term.

This is commonly referred to as a between-within model and allows us to explore the extent to
which a school’s presence in a competitive transfer market moderates the effects of attrition and
transfer rates (Allison, 2009).
The resulting within-school estimate is similar to that obtained in the first model; it compares
changes in a school’s attrition and transfer rates to changes in its first-time pass differential. The
between-school estimate is an estimate of how differences in each school’s average attrition and
transfer rates relate to differences in its first-time pass differential. 7 In practical terms, this means
we separate our explanatory variables into (1) an average for each school (between-school
These between-school estimates should not be interpretated in isolation. We do not include any control variables
for what other differences might exist between these schools, so these values are likely biased. This is not a problem
for our analysis, which focuses on the within-school variance. The presence of the between-school estimates are
what enable us to examine the effect of presence in transfer market—and are treated as such here and throughout.

7
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component), across the years in our sample and (2) the difference between the school’s average
and its attrition or transfer rate in a given year (within-school component). (See Table A.2.)
FINDINGS
The initial phase of investigating Bahadur et al.’s claim is to examine whether relationships exist
between a school’s attrition and transfer rates and both its pass differential and LSAT/UGPA
index score.
At first glance, there does appear to be a relationship between a school’s first-time pass
differential and its rates of attrition and transfer (see Figure 1). Furthermore, there is evidence of
a relationship (albeit curvilinear for transfer-in rates) between a school’s median LSAT/UGPA
index score and both its attrition and transfer rates.
Figure 2

Attrition and Transfer-Out Rates Are Negatively Associated with Pass Differential and
LSAT/UGPA Index Score; Positively for Transfer-In Rates

Mean Pass Differential

(Entering Cohort 2013–2016)

Mean LSAT/UGPA Index Score

Mean Attrition Rate
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Mean Transfer-In Rate

Mean Transfer-Out Rate

Moreover, the number of students attriting and transferring is not inconsequential. On average,
from 2011 to 2020 the number of 1L law students attriting and transferring was approximately
33,000 (8.4 percent of total JD enrollment for the period) and 18,000 (4.9 percent), respectively.
This suggests that although a minority, these students represent a significant proportion of the
total law school student population. Furthermore, lower-ranked schools lose more students than
they gain via transfer and, conversely, higher-ranked schools bring in more students than they
lose. (See “Transfer Markets” below for a larger discussion of student transfers.)
Thus, it seems that attrition and transfer rates might be confounding variables in Kinsler (2021)
and Kinsler and Usman’s (2018) models and therefore that Bahadur et al.’s hypothesis deserves
further investigation.
Attrition and Transfer Rates
Changes to a school’s attrition and transfer rates do not appear to have practically meaningful
effects on its pass differential. For attrition, a school that increases its academic attrition from the
minimum (0 percent) to the maximum (48 percent) would be expected to increase its pass
differential by 13.1 percentage points. Although this is a statistically significant finding (p <
0.05), it requires an unrealistic increase in attrition in order to realize the large gain in pass
differential. A more plausible yet still substantial increase from 7 to 14 percent attrition is
predicted to increase pass differential by only 0.6 percentage points.
The relationship between changes to a school’s transfer-in rates and its pass differential is
negative, albeit considerably weaker than that for attrition. Increasing a school’s transfer-in rate
from the minimum (0 percent) to the maximum (24 percent), is expected to yield a 3.2
percentage point decrease in pass differential. Like with attrition, realizing this pass differential
gain would require an improbably large increase in transfer-in rate. A more plausible increase
from 5 percent to 10 percent is predicted to decrease pass differential by only 0.3 percentage
points.
There does not appear to be a relationship between changes in a school’s transfer-out rates and
its pass differential. A change in a school’s transfer-out rate from the minimum (0 percent) to the
maximum (32 percent) would be predicted to decrease pass differential by less than 0.1
percentage points.
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Figure 3

A School’s Pass Differential is Affected Only with Large Swings in Attrition and at the Middleto-Top of the Distribution; it is Largely Unaffected by Changes to its Transfer-In, or
Transfer-Out Rates

Predicted Pass Differential

16%
Attrition Rate

12%
8%
4%
0%
-4%

Min.

Median

3rd Quartile

Max.

Despite the small effects of attrition and transfer-in rates on pass differential, we posit that if
Bahadur et al.’s supposition were to be true, perhaps attrition rates might moderate transfer-in
rates—and vice versa. We, therefore, explore this possibility by interacting attrition and transferin rates. We find that adding this interaction to the model improves model fit, to a small degree.
Potential Moderating Effects of Transfer-In and Attrition
There does appear to be some evidence that attrition may moderate the effect of changes to a
school’s transfer-in rate on pass differential. That is, the effect of transfer-in rates on pass
differential varies by a school’s attrition rate.
For schools with average or above average attrition, an increase in transfer-in rates is negatively
associated with pass differential, with the effect being largest for those schools with above
average attrition rates. For a school with an attrition rate of 14 percent (1 standard deviation
above the mean), we would expect that an increase in transfer-in rates from the minimum (0
percent) to the maximum (24 percent) would yield a 6 percentage point decrease in pass
differential; for a school with an attrition rate of 21 percent (2 standard deviations above the
mean), we would expect a decrease of 9 percentage points. We, therefore, consider this
moderating effect surprising, but fairly inconsequential.
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Figure 4

Transfer-In Rates More Negatively Affect Pass Differential for Schools with Above Average
Attrition Rates
2.7%

Predicted Pass Differential

2.5%
1.1%
Above Avg.
Attrition Rate
(+2 sd)

Above Avg.
Attrition Rate
(+1 sd)

-0.5%

-3.5%
-5.0%
-6.3%
-6.5%

Min.
0%

Mean
4%

+1 sd
8%

+2 sd
12%

+3 sd
16%

+4 sd
20%

Max.
24%

Transfer-In Rate

Transfer-in rates do not appear to meaningfully moderate the effect of changes to a school’s
attrition rate and its pass differential. As shown in Figure 5, the shape of the curves is fairly
similar regardless of the level of a school’s transfer-in rate. Nonetheless, there are some
differences, most notably that the effect of attrition on pass differential is larger for schools with
average or below average transfer-in rates.
Figure 5

Attrition Rates More Positively Affect Pass Differential for Schools with Average and Below
Average Transfer-In Rates
Below Avg.
Transfer-In Rate
(-1 sd)
Avg.
Transfer-In Rate

16%

Predicted Pass Differnetial

14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

Min.
-2% 0%
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Mean
7%

+1 sd
14%

+2 sd
21%

+3 sd
28%

Attrition Rate

+4 sd
35%

+5 sd
42%

Max.
48%

To better illustrate these effects, Figure 6 compares five schools with varying levels of attrition
and transfer-in rates. The accompanying dotted line notes the predicted pass differential for each
school. Note that the confidence intervals beyond 21 percent attrition and 12 percent transfer-in
are considerable and are presented here for illustrative purposes only. For this reason, they are
presented separately from those figures above for which we have more narrow confidence
intervals.
School A with average attrition (7 percent) and below average transfer-in rates (0
percent, or one standard deviation below the mean) would be expected to have a pass
differential of 0 percent.
School B with average attrition (7 percent) and average transfer-in rates (4 percent) also
has a predicted pass differential of 0 percent.
School C with above average attrition (14 percent, or one standard deviation above the
mean) and average transfer-in rates (4 percent) sees a slight increase in predicted pass
differential at 1 percent.
School D with above average attrition (21 percent, or two standard deviations above the
mean) and below average transfer-in rates (0 percent; one standard deviation below the
mean) has a predicted pass differential of 3 percent.
School E with the same above-average attrition rates as school D but correspondingly
high transfer-in rates (12 percent; two standard deviations above the mean) sees a drop in
predicted pass differential at -1 percent.
Figure 6

Attrition is Generally Associated with a Higher Pass Differential; Especially When Transfer-In
Rate is Low
Att
21%

25%

Att
21%

20%
Att
14%

Xfr-in
12%

0%
Att
7%

10%

Att
7%
Xfr-in
4%

-6%
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Xfr-in
4%

5%
Xfr-in
0%

Xfr-in
0%
School A

15%

School B

School C

School D

School E

0%

Attrition/Transfer-in Rate

Predicted Pass Differential

6%

Transfer Markets
At a national level, those schools with lower median LSATs and lower U.S. News rankings tend
to lose more students to transfer, with those students typically enrolling at institutions with
higher median LSAT scores and rankings. Conversely, those schools with the highest median
LSAT scores almost exclusively have the lowest (or in many cases, zero) transfer-out rates.
Moreover, transfer rates do appear to some extent to be related to the geographic location of a
law school. Most notable is the geographic clustering of students transferring into schools in
Washington, D.C., and the Georgia-Florida region of the southeast. Also, Arizona sees some of
the highest transfer-in rates of any jurisdiction in the country. Transfers out also cluster in the
Mid-Atlantic and southeast regions, with Florida, South Carolina, Delaware, and the District of
Columbia seeing the highest transfer-out rates.
Figure 7

Transfer Activity Tends to Cluster in Some Geographical Regions Creating Possible “Transfer
Markets”
Students Transferring In

Students Transferring Out

We have developed an interactive map of each law school’s transfers. This tool details, for each
school, to where and whence its students transfer. It is available on our webpage:
https://accesslex.shinyapps.io/law_student_transfer_pathways/.
At a more granular level, examining some of these hotspots, it appears that many transfers occur
in-region. For example, a majority of transfers in Chicago transfer to other Chicago schools;
Northwestern Law, a nationally renowned law school, sees nearly half of its transfer students
coming from other Chicago schools. The regions where this pattern appears to be most notable
are: Chicago, the District of Columbia, Florida, New England, Southern California, and Texas.
(See Table A.5 for a list of schools included in these regions.) Figure 8 illustrates, for each
school in the Chicago and Southern California regions, the origins and destinations of student
transfer. Typically, students stay within the region and transfer to a school with a higher ranking.
For schools such as the University of Chicago, which are close to many other schools but not
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near one with a higher ranking, students transferring out tend to move to different jurisdictions
altogether to enter a higher-ranked J.D. program.
Figure 8

Within Some Regions, Many Transfer Students Stay Within-Region, Transferring to HigherRanked Schools
(Chicago and Southern California)

Chicago Region

Out of Market
296

John Marshall
158
DePaul
105

Out of Market
314

Northwestern
200

U. of Chicago: 154

Loyola-Chicago: 85
Chicago-Kent IIT: 84

Southern California Region

Northwestern: 22
U. of Chicago: 12

Out of Market
526

Chicago-Kent IIT: 45
John Marshall: 20
DePaul: 15
Loyola-Chicago: 13

UCLA
267

Out of Market
262
Southwestern Law
133
Pepperdine: 88
Loyola Marymount: 80
Western State: 70
UC Irvine: 61
Chapman: 37
UCLA: 35
USC: 23

Loyola Marymount
238
USC: 91
Chapman: 72
Pepperdine: 48
Western State: 36
UC Irvine: 25
Southwestern Law: 14

Transfer Index Effects on Transfer Rates
We utilize a transfer index variable to examine the extent to which transfer rates are themselves
affected by whether the school is located in proximity to other law schools. We created this
index by grouping schools into 22 regions using each school’s geographic coordinates.
Employing a 100km radius around each school, we identify schools with overlapping circles to
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be part of the same region. We also made minor adjustments after the fact when necessary 8, and
some schools do not fall into a geographic market with any other schools.
Within each of these regions, we assigned each school its U.S. News ranking for a given year and
calculated the difference between the total number of schools and the number of schools with a
lower ranking in a given year. Schools that were not assigned to a region were assigned the
average index value for the given year (because this variable was standardized within each year
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1, the value is 0). As a result, a larger index number means
that a school is more likely to transfer-in students and less likely to transfer-out students.
We find that the higher the transfer index value, the more likely a school is to transfer-in students
and less likely to transfer-out students, holding each school’s LSAT-UGPA index constant. A
one-point increase in transfer index is associated with a 92 percent increase in a school’s
transfer-in rate and a 32 percent decrease in transfer-out rate.
Thus, overall location in close proximity to other schools appears to favor higher-ranked schools
by increasing the number of students transferring into the institution while decreasing the
number transferring out.
Transfer Market Moderation
With our between-within modeling approach, we are able to explore how the effect of being in
one of the most active transfer markets moderates the effects of changes in transfer-in and
attrition rates on pass differential. For these models, we include the transfer index variable. We
find that the effects of a school’s average attrition and transfer-in rates on pass differential are
not moderated by the school’s transfer index; the size and direction of the effect is the same
regardless of whether a school is located in close proximity to others with higher, similar, or
lower rankings.
As seen in Figure 9, the slope of the lines for attrition (left figure), transfer-in (center figure), and
transfer-out (right figure) rates do not vary by a school’s transfer index, which is displayed at
three levels: one standard deviation below the mean (dark blue line), the mean (teal line), and
one standard deviation above the mean (orange line). If a moderating effect were to be present,
the slopes of the lines would differ across the various levels of transfer index.
The difference in the lines is due to the different starting points for schools at the various transfer
index levels—recall that higher transfer index values mean that the school has a higher U.S.
News ranking relative to the schools within a 100km radius. On average, high-transfer-index
schools have higher pass differentials, so they intercept the y-axis at a higher point. This does
not, however, mean that the effect of attrition or transfer rates is any different than it is for
schools with lower transfer index values.

For example, a school could be moved to a different cluster if it was in close proximity (yet just outside of the
100km radium) and it tended to either receive or lose transfer students from/to the nearby cluster.

8
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Figure 9

A School’s Transfer Index Does Not Affect the Relationships Between Changes in its Attrition, Transfer-In, and Transfer-Out Rates
and its Pass Differential
Above Avg. Transfer Index
6%

Avg. Transfer Index

Below Avg. Transfer Index
6%

6%
5%

4%

5%

5%
4%

4%

4%
4%

3%

2%

2%

2%

2%

2%

2% 2%

0%

0%

1%
0%
0%

0%

0%
-1%

-2%

Attrition Rate

Page | 18

Max.
48%

-2%

Min.
0%

2%

2%

Mean
4%

+1 sd +2 sd+3 sd
8% 12% 16%

Transfer-In Rate

Max.
24%

1%

0%
-1%

-1%

Min. Mean +1 sd +2 sd +3 sd
0%
7% 14% 21% 28%

4%

3%

2%
2% 2%

4%

-2%

Min.
0%

Mean +1 sd +2 sd
+3 sd Max.
4%
8% 12%16% 24%

Transfer-Out Rate

DISCUSSION
Among the vast majority of schools (those with attrition and transfer rates less than two standard
deviations above the mean), variation in a school’s rates of attrition and transfer does not appear
to meaningfully affect pass differential. Schools typically experience variation in all three rates
from year to year, especially schools with relatively small cohorts in which changes of only a
few students attriting or transferring can produce a noticeable shift in attrition and transfer rates.
However, the limited influence of attrition and transfer on institutional bar exam performance
does not negate the notion that the loss of students from one school and the gain of those students
by another does no harm or provides no benefit; rather, it suggests that transfers and dismissals
do not appear to substantively affect a school’s bar exam performance when attrition and
transfer-in rates are less than two standard deviations above the mean.
That said, the interaction effect between attrition and transfer-in rates suggests that that decisions
regarding transfer-in policies may influence attrition policies, or vice versa—we cannot
disentangle the direction of the moderation. For example, a school might transfer-in more
students to compensate for attriting more students. Or it might attrite more students so that it can
have more open seats for transfer-in students. Therefore, the existence of this interaction might
provide early circumstantial evidence to support Bahadur et al.’s hypothesis.
However, although this moderating effect exists, on average, it appears to run contrary to the
theory posited by Bahadur et al.: the pass differential for schools with high attrition rates
decreases as the transfer-in rate increases (according to Bahadur et al.’s theory, the pass
differential should increase) and the effect of higher attrition for schools with above average
transfer-in rates is negligible (whereas, Bahadur et al.’s theory predicts that this combination
would yield an appreciable increase in pass differential).
With respect to transfer index, we find that a school’s proximity to others and its relative ranking
among this group of regional peers influences the number of students transferring both in and
out. This relationship does not, however, appear to moderate or alter the effect of changes in a
school’s attrition, transfer-in, or transfer-out rates on its pass differential. This finding appears to
be contrary to Bahadur et al.’s hypothesis. We would expect, given Bahadur et al.’s hypothesis,
that schools with above average transfer index values would benefit more by higher attrition and
transfer-in rates.
We also looked descriptively at those schools with above average (1) attrition rates, (2) transferin rates, and (3) transfer index values. Only two schools met these criteria: Florida International
University (FIU) and Seton Hall University. Both of these schools are mentioned prominently in
Kinsler and Usman (2018) and Bahadur et al. (2021). Kinsler (2021) ranks FIU second overall
and Seton Hall University thirteenth. Due to their rankings in Kinsler (2021), much attention is
given to these two schools by Bahadur et al.
Looking more broadly, nine schools (FIU, Seton Hall University, and seven others; see Table 1)
have both above average transfer-in rates and attrition rates. The majority of the schools in Table
1 either award degrees to minority candidates at a higher-than-average rate, enroll more part-time
students than average, or have a more racially diverse faculty. Most notably, FIU encompasses
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all the above. This may suggest that these schools are “mission-driven,” meaning they
consciously admit underrepresented students at higher rates, including those with lower LSAT
scores who are less likely to pass the bar exam, in order to broaden access to legal education and
the profession. This is not to say that underrepresented students should generally be expected to
perform poorly on the bar; it is an acknowledgment of extant evidence that underrepresented
minority students have lower odds of passing the bar exam (see, e.g., Taylor et al., 2021;
American Bar Association, 2021). This is a barrier that encourages some law schools to admit
students of color at lower rates.
Combining our statistical results with a descriptive look at those schools with average or aboveaverage attrition and transfer-in rates, there is only limited and, in some ways, contradictory
evidence to support the supposition that, on average, schools leverage their attrition and transfer
rates to bolster their bar performance substantively affect a school’s bar passage rates.
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Table 1

Comparison of Nine Schools with Higher than Average Attrition and Transfer-In Rates
Bar
Pass
%

Pass
Differential

Median
LSAT

Median
UGPA

Adm
it
Rate

%
FullTime

%
Minority
Degrees

%
Minority
Faculty

Appalachian School of Law
(Att: 16%; Xfr-in: 5%)

43%

-32%

145

2.97

49%

99%

12%

9%

City U. of New York
(Att: 11%; Xfr-in: 4%)

78%

-4%

153

3.31

40%

90%

34%

36%

Florida International U.a
(Att: 10%; Xfr-in: 11%)

89%

22%

156

3.61

28%

76%

64%

48%

Hofstra U.b
(Att: 8%; Xfr-in: 7%)

62%

-20%

153

3.33

58%

97%

28%

9%

Lincoln Memorial U.
(Att: 30%; Xfr-in: 11%)

76%

-2%

150

3.07

53%

60%

9%

20%

Seton Hall U.a
(Att: 8%; Xfr-in: 8%)

85%

10%

157

3.45

50%

68%

22%

12%

St. Thomas U. (Florida)
(Att: 19%; Xfr-in: 4%)

58%

-10%

147

3.06

61%

95%

79%

29%

U. of Idaho
(Att: 8%; Xfr-in: 4%)

73%

-4%

152

3.20

59%

98%

20%

12%

U. of Toledo
(Att: 13%; Xfr-in: 5%)

75%

-1%

152

3.33

61%

79%

13%

8%

Avg. Across All Schools
(Att, 7%; Xfr-in, 4%)

76%

1%

156

3.39

50%

89%

26%

15%

School Name
(Attrition/Transfer-In Rate)

School was identified as a top 15 school by Kinsler (2021); bSchool was identified as a bottom 15 school by
Kinsler (2021).
a

LIMITATIONS
This research relies upon publicly available data that is reported annually to the ABA by each
accredited law school. Since the data is self-reported, there are occasionally inconsistencies in
the data. These inconsistencies are likely the result of data entry error. In rare cases, intentional
misreporting has been alleged. For example, in a March 2022 New York Times article, a
professor at Columbia University challenged the school’s undergraduate U.S. News ranking,
charging the university with manipulating the data it reports to increase its ranking. Moreover, in
2021, a former dean of Temple University’s business school was convicted of intentionally
misreporting data in order to improve the school’s ranking and revenue.
We have taken great care to identify and correct any observed abnormalities. We find no
evidence of data manipulation in the data we use in this analysis. Notwithstanding, one common
error we observed involves the reporting of attrition and transfer rates. Schools often adjust
attrition rates reported for previous years to account for changes in their first-year class sizes. In
light of this, we have calculated the attrition and transfer rates for each school using their
reported enrollment, attrition, and transfer counts, rather than rely on the reported rate values.
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Schools may also misreport attrition, attributing what should be first-year attrition to the second
year. We have carefully examined the dataset and corrected those instances where this error was
apparent. This is tricky, however, as academic attrition policies vary widely across institutions,
with some placing students on academic probation following the first-year and then attriting
them only after they fail to meet a required benchmark in the third or fourth semester. Thus, a
large number of second-year transfers may not necessarily indicate a data entry error.
From year-to-year, the ABA reporting requirements related to attrition and transfer have been
modified. Due to these changes, we do not include data from the first two years of available
ABA data.
We also deliberately exclude data for graduates who took the bar exam in 2020 or 2021.
Although this allows us to avoid issues related to inconsistency with the bar exam due to the
various adjustments and alterations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the downside is that
we do not capture more recent changes in enrollment trends (e.g., increased admission rates for
women, increases in matriculation).
CONCLUSION
Some researchers have expressed concerns about schools using attrition and transfer policies to
inflate bar passage rates (Bahadur et al. 2021), an interesting thesis worthy of attention
considering the implications for academic and bar success professionals whose efforts to prepare
law students for the bar exam could be undermined if certain institutions are found to take
shortcuts to bar passage improvement. However, our research only finds limited evidence to
support this notion: attrition rates are positively associated with pass differential; transfer-in rates
are negatively associated. (Transfer-out rates do not appear to have a meaningful impact on pass
differential.)
When examined in combination, high transfer-in rates counter the effects of high attrition rates in
predicting an institution’s first-time pass differential. Transfer index, however, does not
moderate the effect of attrition and transfer-in rates.
Finally, some actors in legal education have proposed that lower-ranked schools face undue
difficulty complying with ABA accreditation standards because they are vulnerable to losing
their top performers to higher-ranked schools via transfer (e.g., Garcia et al., 2016; Society of
American Law Teachers [SALT], 2019). Given that lower-ranked schools are inherently more
vulnerable to being harmed by this dynamic, some have suggested that a type of credit-sharing or
acknowledgement of transfer students’ original law school in bar passage statistics is in order
(Garcia et. al, 2016; SALT, 2019). The ABA also acknowledges in its Standard 316 Guidance
Memo that some students may transfer out of a school and pass the bar exam as a graduate of
another law school, and it enables noncompliant institutions to use evidence of such trends to
demonstrate “good cause” to extend the time they are given to reenter compliance with the
Standard (ABA, 2019, pg. 3).
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Our results suggest that, on average, transfer-out rates generally do not significantly harm pass
differentials, nor do transfer-in rates significantly bolster pass differentials. And although we find
that institutional bar passage rates fall as transfer rates increase, the reduction only lowers the
pass differential by a percentage point or less. Nonetheless, law schools that fall only a
percentage point short of the 75 percent benchmark may use our results to show that there is a
high probability that losing students to transfer reduced their passage rate just enough to fall out
of compliance. This argument is likely effective for schools with smaller cohort sizes, as a
relatively small difference in the number of students passing the bar has a greater impact on their
overall passage rate.
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APPENDIX
Descriptive Appendix
Table A.1

Descriptive Statistics

First-Time Bar Pass
Differential
First-Time Pass Rate
Transfer-In Rate
Attrition Rate
Transfer-Out Rate
UGPA (mean)
LSAT (median)
Minority Degrees
Awarded (%)
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Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Min.

Max.

0.01

0.01

0.12

-0.44

0.27

0.75
0.04
0.07
0.03
3.39
156
0.26

0.78
0.03
0.05
0.02
3.39
155
0.22

0.15
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.24
6.63
0.15

0.30
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.79
141
0.02

0.99
0.24
0.48
0.24
3.93
173
1.00

Table A.2

Multilevel Models Employed
Method

Obs.
(# of
Schools)

Explanatory Variable(s)*

RQ1:
On average, to what extent do
attrition, transfer in, and
transfer out rates affect
institutional first-time bar
passage performance?

Fixed effects
(also referred to as
“no pooling”)

748
(189)

• Attrition rate
• Transfer-in rate
• Transfer-out rate

RQ2:
Does transfer activity vary by
institutions’ geographic
proximity to other law schools
with higher or lower rankings?
And, if so, how?

Mixed Effects
Poisson

748
(189)

• Transfer index

748
(189)

• Attrition rate
o Yearly rate
minus mean rate
o Mean rate
• Transfer-in rate
o Yearly rate
minus mean rate
o Mean rate
• Transfer-out rate
o Yearly rate
minus mean rate
o Mean rate
• Transfer index

RQ3:
Are the effects of attrition and
transfer rates on institutional
first-time bar passage rates
moderated by whether a law
school is in close proximity to
others with higher or lower
rankings?

Between-within
random effects
(contains both
fixed and random
effects)

Outcome
Variable

Pass differential

Counts of:
Transfers in
Transfers out

Pass differential

Note: *All models include a dummy variable for the year the students matriculated, to account for correlation among observations
from the same schools in different years.
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Figure A.1

Calculating a School’s Pass Differential Through June 2019 9

Assume School X had 180 graduates in a given year who took the bar exam for the first time, 90 in State A, 45 in
State B, and 45 in State C.
The following table illustrates how the weighted averages and pass differential for School X would be calculated.

State A

State B

State C

# Takers

90

45

45

% Takers

50

25

25

# Passers

81

27

18

Pass rate (%)

90

60

40

Weighted pass rate (%)

45

15

10

Pass rate (%)

90

80

60

Weighted pass rate (%)

45

20

15

School X

Weighted
Avg.

70

ABA Avg.

Pass Differential (%)

80
- 10

The weighted average for the school is calculated by taking the pass rate for the school in the three states and
weighting it in proportion to the number of students taking the bar exam in the three states. Here, of the 180
graduates taking the bar exam in these three states, 50% took the exam in State A, 25% took the exam in State B,
and 25% took the exam in State C. So, by multiplying the pass rate for the school in each state by its proportional
weight, and adding those results together, one arrives at a weighted average pass rate of 70 percent for graduates
of the school who took the bar exam in these three states.
By multiplying the overall pass rate in each state by the proportional weight determined by looking at the number
of the school’s graduates who took the exam in each state (here, 50%, 25%, and 25%), and adding those results
together, one arrives at a weighted average pass rate of 80 percent for all first-time takers from ABA-approved
law schools in these three states.
The difference of these two weighted averages is the pass differential.
Source: Adapted from American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Report to the House of Delegates
(February 2008).

Note: The guidelines surrounding this reporting were changed in May 2019 as a result of revisions made to the
ABA’s accreditation standards. Beginning in Spring 2020, schools are now required to report bar passage outcomes

9
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Table A.3

Description of Model Variables1
Variable Name

Variable Type

Description and/or Available Responses

Admission Rate

Continuous

Percent of applicants admitted to school.

Attrition Rate

Continuous

Non-transfer attrition rate of a given school in a given
year

Cohort

Categorical

Indicates which admission year the relevant cohort
entered. Four cohorts total in sample.

Full Time JD (%)

Continuous

Percentage of enrolled students who are full-time
students.

LSAT/UGPA Index

Continuous

Constructed by converting the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentile LSAT scores into a proportion (total points
out of a possible 180) adding them, and doing the same
for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile UGPA. These sums
are then weighted by their respective explanatory power
(of pass differential), added, and then scaled between 0
and 1.2

Degrees Awarded to Students of
Color (%)

Continuous

Percentage of JDs the school awarded to underrepresented minority (Black, Hispanic, and
Native/Indigenous) students.

Faculty of Color (%)

Continuous

Percent of faculty who are racial/ethnic minorities.

Section Size

Count

Count of number of students in average section of firstyear JD course.

School Type

Categorical

Classification of school as either public or private.

Student-Faculty Ratio

Continuous

Ratio of number of students to faculty members.

Transfer Market Index

Count

Count of geographically proximate schools with higher
U.S. News rankings.

Transfer-In Rate

Continuous

Transfer-in rate (percent of 1L cohort) of a given school
in a given year

Transfer-Out Rate

Continuous

Transfer-out rate (percent of 1L cohort) of a given
school in a given year

Note: 1Not all variables are employed in all models, see the regression outputs in the appendix for the list of variables included
in each model; 2when adding the proportioned LSAT and UGPA measurements together, UGPA is weighted by its affect
when our dependent variable, bar pass differential, is regressed by the LSAT and UGPA measures. Since the coefficient on
UGPA is 22 percent that of LSAT, UGPA is weighted by 0.22 when it is added to the LSAT measure.

for all students. In addition, the use of the weighted average is no longer calculated, reported, nor relied upon for
compliance purposes.
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Analytical Appendix
Table A.5

RQ1 Model Results

Attrition Rate
Attrition Rate (squared)
Transfer-In Rate
Transfer-In Rate (squared)

No Interaction

Interaction

(n = 749)

(n = 749)

-0.019

-0.001

(0.050)

(0.050)

0.147***

0.154***

(0.053)

(0.053)

-0.009

0.038

(0.037)

(0.041)

-0.023

-0.040

(0.045)

(0.045)
-0.200**

Interaction Term: Attrition Rate
Given Transfer-In Rate
Transfer-Out Rate
LSAT/UGPA Index
Degrees Awarded to Graduates of
Color (%)
Degrees Awarded to Graduates of
Color (%; squared)
1L Section Size

R2
Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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(0.078)
-0.001

-0.012

(0.020)

(0.020)

0.504***

0.516***

(0.088)

(0.088)

-0.134

-0.133

(0.083)

(0.083)

0.014

0.018

(0.127)

(0.126)

-0.039**

-0.041**

(0.018)

(0.018)

0.155

0.165

Table A.6

RQ2 Model Results

Transfer Index
Public School
2014 Cohort
2015 Cohort

Transfers In

Transfers Out

(n = 749)

(n = 749)

0.650***

-0.384***

(0.063)

(0.068)

-0.021

-0.377***

(0.099)

(0.107)

-0.081

-0.081

(0.054)

(0.055)

-0.211

***

(0.055)

(0.056)

-0.307***

-0.702***

(0.056)

(0.061)

Akaike Inf. Crit.

3,967.739

4,007.802

Bayesian Inf. Crit.

4,004.689

4,044.752

2016 Cohort

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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-0.183***

Table A.7

RQ3 Model Results
Between-Within Models

Mean Attrition Rate (square root)
Attrition Rate (difference)
Attrition Rate (squared difference)
Mean Transfer-In Rate (square root)
Transfer-In Rate (square root difference)
Mean Transfer-Out Rate (square root)
Transfer-Out Rate (difference)

No Interaction

Interaction

(n = 749)

(n = 749)

0.029

0.030

(0.035)

(0.035)

-0.004

-0.005

(0.047)

(0.047)

0.108**

0.150***

(0.047)

(0.050)

-0.021

-0.028

(0.028)

(0.028)

-0.011

-0.010

(0.015)

(0.015)

-0.088***

-0.078***

(0.022)

(0.022)

-0.009

-0.012

(0.018)

(0.018)

Transfer Index

0.016**

-0.008

(0.007)

(0.012)

LSAT/UGPA Index

0.909***

0.899***

(0.074)

(0.077)

-0.419***

-0.397***

(0.069)

(0.073)

0.044*

0.045*

(0.023)

(0.023)

-0.044***

-0.045***

(0.015)

(0.015)

LSAT/UGPA Index (squared)
Percent Faculty of Color (square root)
1L Section Size
School Type: Public School

0.009

0.009

(0.008)

(0.007)

0.018***

0.018***

(0.005)

(0.005)

2015 Cohort

0.020***

0.021***

(0.005)

(0.005)

2016 Cohort

0.022***

0.024***

(0.005)

(0.005)

2014 Cohort

Interaction: Attrition Rate (difference) Given Transfer
Index

0.074**

Interaction: Transfer Index Given Transfer-In Rate
(difference, square root)

0.031*

(0.031)
(0.018)

Akaike Inf. Crit.

-2,176.235

-2,175.124

Bayesian Inf. Crit.

-2,088.479

-2,078.130

Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; all continuous variables are scaled 0-1, except transfer index, which is
normalized with mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
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Table A.8

Interacting Effect of Attrition Rates Given Various Levels of TransferIn Rates
Attrition Rate
Transfer-In Rate:
0%

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Attrition Rate

Transfer-In Rate:
4%

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Attrition Rate

Transfer-In Rate:
8%
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0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%

Predicted Bar
Pass Differential
-1%
0%
1%
3%
4%
5%
6%
Predicted Bar
Pass Differential
0%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
Predicted Bar
Pass Differential
0%
0%
1%
2%
2%
3%
3%

Confidence
Interval
[-2%, 1%]
[-1%, 1%]
[-0%, 2%]
[2%, 4%]
[3%, 5%]
[3%, 7%]
[4%, 9%]
Confidence
Interval
[-1%, 1%]
[0%, 1%]
[1%, 1%]
[2%, 3%]
[2%, 4%]
[2%, 5%]
[3%, 7%]
Confidence
Interval
[-1%, 1%]
[-1%, 1%]
[0%, 1%]
[1%, 3%]
[1%, 4%]
[1%, 5%]
[1%, 6%]

Table A.9

Interacting Effect of Transfer-In Rates Given Various Levels of Attrition Rates
Transfer-In Rate
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%

Attrition Rate: 0%

Transfer-In Rate
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%

Attrition Rate: 5%

Transfer-In Rate
Attrition Rate: 10%

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%

Predicted Bar
Pass Differential
-1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
Predicted Bar
Pass Differential
1%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Predicted Bar
Pass Differential
3%
2%
1%
0%
0%
-1%

Confidence
Interval
[-2%, 1%]
[-1%, 1%]
[-2%, 1%]
[-2%, 2%]
[-3%, 3%]
[-3%, 5%]
Confidence
Interval
[0%, 2%]
[0%, 1%]
[0%, 1%]
[-1%, 2%]
[-2%, 2%]
[-3%, 3%]
Confidence
Interval
[2%, 4%]
[1%, 3%]
[0%, 2%]
[-2%, 2%]
[-3%, 2%]
[-5%, 2%]

Table A.10

The Effect of Various Transfer-Out Rates on Pass Differential
Transfer-Out
Rate
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10 %
32 %
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Predicted Bar
Pass Differential
0.46 %
0.46 %
0.46 %
0.46 %
0.45 %
0.45 %
0.45 %
0.45 %
0.45 %
0.45 %
0.45 %
0.41 %

Confidence
Interval
-0.57%, 1.50%
-0.51%, 1.43%
-0.46%, 1.38%
-0.43%, 1.34%
-0.41%, 1.32%
-0.41%, 1.31%
-0.42%, 1.32%
-0.45%, 1.35%
-0.49%, 1.39%
-0.55%, 1.44%
-0.61%, 1.50%
-2.96%, 3.79%

